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BIANNUAL SURVEY

Unfortunately, however, the court made no mention of that case
despite the fact that it had been decided by a lower court in its
own department. Therefore, it cannot be unequivocally stated that
Ciaffone has been overruled.
CPLR 3101(c) and (d): Defendant's expert may not be called
by plaintiff, nor are his reports subject to disclosure.
Gugliano v. Levy"39 involved a malpractice action against a
hospital and two of its doctors. Defendants' attorneys procured
the services of an expert to investigate and determine whether their
clients were in fact guilty of malpractice. In his report to the
attorneys the expert stated that in his opinion malpractice had
occurred. Plaintiff called the expert in order to introduce the
report in rebuttal to defendants' denial of malpractice. The appellate
division held that it was error for the trial court to have allowed
such action stating:
it permitted plaintiff indirectly to contravene the interdictions contained in the
present practice code covering discovery procedurs, which absolutely prohibit
the utilization of an attorney's work product by his adversary and which
conditionally bar his use, without prior leave of the court, of the opinion of
an expert who had been retained by an opposing party.... Uo

In the last installment of the Survey, reference was made to
the need for amending CPLR 3101(c) to remove the absolute
protection accorded to an attorney's work product. 14' That subdivision stands as a potential threat to the success of any attorney
seeking disclosure of an item, because of the possibility, however
remote, of a court declaring the item to be an attorney's work
product and thereby barring any chance of disclosure. The possibility of such a holding would be especially vexing to the
practitioner in a situation where an item could just as easily be
classified as material prepared for litigation which is only qualifiedly
protected. This point was raised in conjunction with a discussion
of the Kandel 142 case wherein the court used very loose language in
delineating which provision of CPLR 3101, i.e., either (c) or (d),
precluded disclosure of insured-to-insurer statements. It would
seem that the opinion of the expert falls clearly within the purview
of subdivision (d).
It is submitted that the court should have stated definitively
whether subdivision (c) or (d) of CPLR 3101 precluded disclosure
239 24 App. Div. 2d 591, 262 N.Y.S.2d 372 (2d Dep't 1965).
140 Id. at 591, 262 N.Y.S.2d at 374. (Emphasis added.)
141 The Biannual Survey of New York Practice, 40 ST. JoHn's L. REv.
122, 157 (1965).
142 Kandel v. Tocher, 22 App. Div. 2d 447, 256 N.Y.S.2d 358 (2d Dep't
1965).
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-whether this was an attorney's work product or material prepared
for litigation.
CPLR 3101(d): Protection accorded to statements nude to a
municipality by its employees.
In Donnelly v. County of Nassau,143 plaintiff and a Nassau
County police officer were involved in an automobile accident.
Plaintiff sought discovery of: (1) a memorandum made by the
police officer; and (2) a memorandum and report of investigation
of a police sergeant, which had been forwarded to the county
attorney. The court held that these items were analogous to the
reports made in Finegold v. Lewis'" and Kandel v. Tocher,"4 and
that they were, therefore, exempt from disclosure pursuant to
CPLR 3101(d).'"
In analogizing a municipality to an insurance carrier, the court
classified the former as a self-insurer.147 In Kandel, "insured to
insurer" reports were distinguished from those "resulting from the
regular internal operations of an enterprise," the latter being held
not to fall within the purview of CPLR 3101(d).
The underlying consideration in Kandel, in exempting these
reports from disclosure, was that liability insurance is essentially
litigation insurance. The court evidently was concerned with preventing the problem of information being withheld by the insured
from his liability insurer.
Certainly, in the instant case, it appears that the reports were
made in the regular course of defendant's business-by police
officers to their superiors--despite the fact that defendant was also
a self-insurer. Furthermore, the result which the court in Kandel
was most interested in effectuating, i.e., the disclosure of all relevant
and pertinent information to the liability insurer, would, in all
likelihood, occur without the aid of 3101(d)'s protection. The
withholding of information by the employee is not likely to occur
when weighed against the possibility of consequent termination of
employment.
However, it should be noted that a report made in the regular
course of business might, under certain instances, also be material
prepared for litigation. This dual classification of a report, as
illustrated in Donnelly, with its consequent legal effects in the area
'4346 Misc. 2d 895, 261 N.Y.S2d 192 (App. Term 7d Dep't 1965).
'L422 App. Div. 2d 447, 256 N.Y.S.2d 358 (2d Dep't 1965).
14522 App. Div. 2d 513, 256 N.Y.S.2d 898 (1st Dep't 1965).
146 These two cases are analyzed in The Biannual Survey of New York

JOHN'S L. REV. 122, 154 (1965).
A self-insurer is exactly what the name imports, i.e., it bears the
risk of its own possible liability, rather than contracting therefor with an
insurance carrier.
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